من وحي الخاطر

 الوثيقة رقم 1

كثر في الآونة الأخيرة الصخب حول تسريبات وكيليكس وعن ما أماطت عنه اللثام من أحاديث رجالات العالم الثالث من المسؤولين و غير المسؤولين (بكل معاني الكلمة) و رجال السفارات الأمريكية. أحاديث حوت في ثناياها خليطا مضحكا أحيانا ومقززا في أحيان أخرى من التملق، و الدهاء و الخيانة. وقد كان لموريتانيا رغم صغرها النسبي، حظ لا بأس به. فلموريتانيا كغيرها من البلدان ساسة لا يجدون غضاضة في الحديث عن ما يدور بخواطرهم من المفيد وغير المفيد لسفارة أمريكا التي تبقي على ما يبدو بابها مفتوحا كعيادة نفسية لهؤلاء، حتى وإن إقتنعت أن لا فائدة من الإستماع إليهم (كما جاء في تعليق في إحدى الوثائق بخصوص أحد السنتورات الموريتانيين).

كون السفارات الأمركية، بل كل سفارات العالم "المتحضر" توثق ما يتطوع الآخرون بجلبه إليها وما تستخلصه منهم رغبة و رهبة هو أمرمعلوم لكل الدارسين لعالم السياسة. و كون هذه الوثائق ستنشر في وقت ما للعموم أمر معروف أيضا. الجديد في الويكيليكس أنها أختصرت الزمن. فبدل أن تبلى سرائر هؤلاء بعد عقود من وقت تسجيلها، بعد أن تكون الأنظمة  السياسية و السياقات الثقافية قد تغيرت، أو بعد أن يموت هؤلاء، فإن وكليكس جعلت من الممكن نشر هذه "الأسرار" ومازالت ألسنة هؤلاء الساسة رطبة من الحديث خلف جدران هذه السفارات. بمعنى آخر أن تكون هذه الأسرار أسرار فقط لمن لا يملك حاسوبا، أو تلفازا، أو إذاعة.

على أية حال، ليس المقام هنا عن الوكيليكس فلتسريباتها أتباع كثر  كفونا مشقة تتبعها. ما نحن بصدد نشره هنا هو ترجمات (توخينا فيها الدقة و الحرفية رغم ما يترتب على ذلك من غياب لسلاسة التراكيب) لسلسلة من وثائق  الخارجية الامريكية  تتعلق بموريتانيا و التي أميط عنها طابع السرية، لكن الكثير من الموريتانيين لا يعرفون عنها الكثير إما بسب عدم القدرة على الوصول إليها أو بسب العائق اللغوي. وقد أرتأينا أن ننقل هذه الوثائق التي تتناول حقبة مهمة من التاريخ الموريتاني لما فيها من الفائدة للدارسين لهذه الحقبة و للأجيال التي لم تعايشها.  تجدر الإشارة هنا  أن هذه الوثائق ليست منتقاة بهدف الإثارة وإنما الفائدة—وعليه فيرجى من هوات الإثارة عدم إضاعة الوقت في قرائتها.

الوثيقة

العلاقات الخارجية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، 1958-1960

المجلد XIV، إفريقيا، الوثيقة 89.

مذكرة محادثة: المصدر: كتابة الدولة لشؤون الخارجية، السجلات المركزية: V.13/12–1260770 . سري. حرر من طرف غلن و ستاترويت في 19 من دجمبر و تم إمضائه من طرف البيت الأبيض في 4 من ينائر 1961.

12 من دجمبر، 1960.

·         الموضوع:

حوار بين الرئيس أيزن هاور و رئيس الوزراء  الموريتاني المختار ولد داداه، في البيت الأبيض في 12 من دجمبر عام 1960.[1]

·         المشاركون:

من الولايات المتحدة:

·         الرئيس أيزن هاور

·         السيد ج. س. ستاترويت، مساعد كاتب الشؤون الإفريقية

·         السيد كلمن هـ. كونغر، مساعد رئيس التشريفات

·         السيد هــ. س. غلن، مترجم

من موريتانيا:

·         رئيس الوزراء المختار ولد داداه

·         نائب رئيس الجمعية الوطنية الموريتانية سليمان ولد الشيخ سيديا

-قام الرئيس بتهنئة رئيس الوزراء على الفيتو السوفياتي في الأمم المتحدة[2]. قال الرئيس مازحا، إن هذا يظهر أن موريتانيا أصبحت واحدة من تلك القوى التي يستهدفها الإتحاد السوفياتي للتنفيس عن غضبه. الرئيس ذكر أنه كان يأمل أن تحل مسألة الإنضمام إلى الأمم المتحدة رغم الإعتراض السوفياتي.

المزيد

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التصنيفات : غير مصنف | السمات:وثائق

أرسل الإدراج

دوّن الإدراج

Ahmed Meiloud

Introduction

A quick survey of the literature on the concept of the dhimma and its application historically shows a great divergence of opinion among scholars. Still most scholars seem to concur that the level of freedom, the kind of rights and prerogatives or rather restrictions that non-Muslims have traditionally either enjoyed or suffered within a Muslims culture were all shaped by the understanding of the status of the dhimmi as a religious “other” in a community of believers. Differences mostly arise in respect to whether the dhimma as a system was originated to respect and protect the religious rights of others in exchange for the recognition of the dominant culture and the contribution to its financial resources by the payment of symbolic tax, or rather as a punitive measure meant to exhaust this “other” and ultimately force him to conversion.  

Most scholars took either or position. That is, they tended to fall into two main camps; those who venerated the dhimma, and those who vilified it. Many Muslim and some Western scholars fall within the first camps, praised dhimma as a form of tolerance that existed at a time when tolerance was such a rare commodity in religious and political discourses. This camp maintains that minorities were able, thanks to the concept of dhimma, to prosper both intellectually and economically and to organize their communal affairs with minimum intervention from the dominant culture. The other camps, which is mostly made of Orientalists, were aghast at the notion that dhimma was as a lenient system. In contrast, they maintain that the dhimma was a racist and discriminatory policy enshrined in religious terminology and it should be presented as such. To call it a tolerant system is, in their view, tantamount to falsifying history. Between these two extremes there are several viewpoints that lean either in this or that direction.

The question of the dhimma has often been invoked in the context of the discussion on the rights of religious minorities (particularly Christian and to a lesser extent Jews) in countries where Muslims constitute the majority. The debate has recently been centered not so much on the historical application of this concept as much as it was on the possibility of its revival if the Islamists are to assume power.  The issue caught the attention of Western scholars in part because of the traditional distrust with which they have viewed Islamic organizations and their ideology. It also became a concern in the view that a central point in the Islamists’ agenda is the application of Shari‘a—which is often portrayed by some Islamists and most western observers as an exclusionary system premised on a religious concept of discrimination.[1]

Evidently, the discussion on this issue is highly shaped by the political context of today’s world, where political Islam evolved into an important player on the local, regional as well as the global stage. Even though the concept is a past reality, one that can only be fully understood within its own context, the tendency to juxtapose it with modern understanding of citizenship made the conflation of the two an inescapable reality. The difficulties that a number of minorities face in Muslim countries—be they Copts in Egypt, Jews in Yemen or other religious minorities— have been interpreted from a religious prism where the image of the Dhimma set the framework for comprehending the social and political boundaries of interaction.  In this analysis, the tribal, racial and ethnic strives as well as socio-economic differences were left out. Only the religious dimension, particularly the concept of dhimma was emphasized.  This view explains why the concept of dhimma is invoked to explain not only the current position of religious minorities (mostly Christians) in the Muslim world, but their recently history as well.  It is also the concept that was deployed in attempt to theorize why one million of Arab Jews have all left their countries of origin and settled in Israel in the second half of 20^th century. The conclusion has often been that because of the difficulty they faced as dhimmis (that is, tolerated but inferior “other”), Jews had to leave.  

Part of this conflation of past and present realities could be explained by the contentious and politicized nature of this topic, where partisan inclinations—not academic investigation— orient and reorient the debate. Still, another part of the conflation stems from a central mistake in the understanding of the two subjects of comparison: Dhimma and citizenship. The fatal mistake lies in the erroneous assumption that each of these concepts is well-defined and practically consistent. Ironically, however, history both recent and past shows otherwise. Historically, the application of dhimma differed across temporal and spatial contexts for a host of social, political, financial and pragmatic reasons. Multiple historical accounts corroborate this fact beyond doubt. For example, the Ottman application of dhimma was not only different across space, but across time as well. The evolution of this system, which happened in response to internal and external factors, culminated in the invention of the millets system introduced by Sultan Mehmet II[2], which was ultimately abandoned with the birth of modern Turkey. In the same vein, most respected scholars on the history of al-Andalus recognize that the application of dhimma in that context had vacillated between being progressive at times of stability to being benign at times of tension.[3] Finally, what is true of the application of dhimma is also true of the conception and application of the notion of citizenship. Far from having a standardized meaning and manifestation, the notion of citizenship has multiple meanings and implications for those who define it (politicians and legislators) and those who are defined by it (ordinary citizens) based on the political, social and economic dictates that define and distinguish every polity from others, but also based on the dictates that make and write the distinctions of the internal structures within any given polity.[4]

The case of Jews in two Arab countries Lebanon and Morocco illustrates the disparity inherent in the implementations of citizenship and of Dhimma itself. While there are similarities in the ways Jews emerged in both countries out of the Dhimma framework to that of the nation-states, their experiences were starkly different. Even though Moroccan Jews in general have attained the status of citizenship early on during the French colonization and also in the post-independence era, a status that was recognized by the royal family as well as by the secular elites of the country, they largely chose to leave Morocco for Israeli. This choice was not often easy, given the geographical distance and the manner in which many left the country: absconding. Previously, however, Jews seemed to have prospered under the ‘Alawid dynasty, despite some frequent unfortunate incidents that punctuated the peaceful interaction with the Moroccan populace on one hand and the royal family on the other. Jews were always seen as protégés of the king and have historically lived in areas adjacent to the Makhzan—translating whereby the political bond to geographical proximity and in the process making it easy for authorities to protect them in times of political unrest. Because of this unique relationship, many of their elites worked in the entourage of the king as viziers, consultants and advisors. Except in the few cases when political unrest brought mayhem, local populations respected and honored the protection extended by the king to this religious minority. When the French came and later when the modern state was established, the individual lives of many Jews improved significantly. Their collective image in the eyes of the local population deteriorated for a host of reasons, however. This development and the feeling of distrust that resulted therefrom certainly played a part in the decision of many to depart to Israel and to other destinations during the 50s and 60s of the last century.

Given these facts, it seems that Morocco at least in regard to its Jews was a place where the system of dhimma produced some form of co-existence, where as the modern state and despite its desire to view all of its subjects as citizens failed—in face of many internal and extraneous dynamics— to keep the societal cohesion that had hitherto existed.   In Lebanon, the reverse is true.. Even though the question of how tolerant or repressive the dhimma system imposed during the Ottomans’ reign in the greater Syria have elicited different responses, there is ample evidence now to suggest that Jews have done relatively well in the post independence Lebanon. At a time when the numbers of Jews dwindled in the neighboring countries as waives of Jewish migrants left their native lands to join the state of Israel in the 50s of the last century, the Jewish community in Lebanon—a country that shared border with Israel—chose to stay. As a matter of fact, the number of Jews was on the increase so much so that it almost doubled in the decade immediately after the creation of the state of Israel. This presence did not seem to have resulted in any tension with the dominant Arabic community in general or the country’s different sects in particular. It was not until the 70s of last century when the sectarian strife led to the civil war that Jewish life in Lebanon started to turn to the worse.

Furthermore, I propose that the additional source of the disagreements in the evaluation of the dhimma emerges from the lack of unified point of reference. Those who embraced the view that the dhimma was a tolerant system came to that conclusion by comparing it with other alternatives that existed in the historical framework in which it was operational. In contrast, the other camps, looks at it from the prism of the modern era, with concepts such as universal human rights and citizenship in mind. It is no wonder, therefore, that they see it as discriminatory and unfair.  A further mistake in regard to this latter group was the generalization that goes into much of the writing of the authors who embrace it. Most of them, for example, were unable or unwilling to see differences not just of understanding of the concept but also of its practice across spaces and times.  The lack of shared starting point leads not only to the divergence of opinions, but to the misunderstanding as well.  Both groups, for example, debate the matter as if it is still relevant to the experiences of minorities in the Muslim world where the paradigm of nation-states has been prevalent at least as a de facto framework since the sixties of the last century (even much earlier for some countries). 

To recapture the essence of the relationship of Muslims and non-Muslims in a Muslim country, it is not enough to invoke the history of theory or the practice of the dhimma system. The history of the region shows that Muslims relationship with others, although was strained at times, have largely been characterized by mutual dependency and coexistence. There is no historical evidence that prior to the ‘Armenian genocide’ during the latter days of the Ottoman or the partly forced migration of Jews from Arab countries in the 40s and 50s of the last century that such events had ever happened. And it is clear that both instances had more to do with the changes in geopolitical calculation between secular or secular-like parties and little to do with the notion of dhimma itself. When the Jews departed Morocco or Egypt to Israeli, it was not because the Jizya tax has suddenly risen, or that religious leaders of the Muslim World had declared that the local Jews have forfeited their dhimmi status. The changes in attitudes were largely the byproduct of a general fragmentation of these societies that went beyond religion and race—one that was a direct result of colonial practices. The rise of nationalism and Zionism as Western phenomenon in Muslim lands, constituted a final blow to the social fabric of these societies— the straw that broke the camel’s back, so to speak.

To put this discussion in perspective we examine here a number of books and articles that provide diverging view points on the issue of dhimma and on how it correlates to the concept of citizenship. These sources bring wide range of views from experts from the Eastern as well as Western world.  Looking through different lenses at different periods of time, these authors elaborate on the theoretical concept and the implication of the implementation of dhimma for non-Muslims throughout history. Although some of these do not directly address the question of Jews, as the concept is traditionally applicable to both Jews and Christians (the people of the book) and have been applied to others as well, these works are included nonetheless because they shed light on the internal Muslims debate on the concept, on the proper way of implementing it and on the overall wisdom behind it. The issues that come through this debate and the legal concepts to which Muslim legal scholars refer are useful as they demonstrate, contrary to the common belief, that Muslim views on the subject were far from monolithic.

In these works, one can discern three main trends. The first presents a more favorable view of the dhimma as they view it from a historical comparative lens. The second trend vilifies it. For the proponent of this view, dhimma was not only forgotten unjust and discriminatory system of past, but rather a de facto ideology. The worst aspect of the literature on dhimma, in the opinions of the authors who follow this trend, is the tendency of some scholars to downplay the negative sides of this system. Even more alarming in their view is the willingness of some to embellish it. The third, and the last trend, projects a more nuanced view. It does not advocate the dhimma. It, however, acknowledges that it was unique and progressive in its context despite the evident bias against non-Muslims in some of its terms and its vulnerability to exploitation. Authors in this category also recognize that it is different from the modern concept of citizenship and looks at the possibilities of adaptations, particularly on Muslims attempts to reconcile the the religious views of ‘others’ and the dictates of modernity. The presentation of these books and articles will be followed by a reflection on the views presented by different groups and the implication for how Muslims understood the dhimma and how Muslims are or will be interpreting it in light of modern discourses on independence, pluralism, and freedom of choice. Some key concept such as the more contentious law of apostasy will be discussed as well.

Negative views of Dhimma

1.

 The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy W

المزيد

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التصنيفات : غير مصنف |

أرسل الإدراج

دوّن الإدراج

 Ahmed Ould-Meiloud

(This was originally a reading response written for a class on gender issues in the Middle East in the fall of 2009.

I post these thoughts here for those who might find them interesting.

There are number of ways in which Satan’s Stones could be read. It could be seen as dramatized depiction of the unkind treatment and challenges facing women living in the remote villages of Iran. Such challenges and mistreatment are, oddly enough, not presented or told in a traditional feminist narrative, where one finds a tormented female object and a tormenting male subject. Rather, women seem more visible, participatory in, and culpable of subjugating their own kind. This is an intra-conflict where the “other” in a sexist sense is invisible, or non-existent. But that concept, though present, does not seem to permeate all the layers of the narrative. It looks very shallow and too explicit to warrant the use of such literary medium. If that was the purpose, then a short newspaper report would do more justice than a short story. Alternatively, It could be read as a contrast between the sordid and miserable condition of rural Iran and its prosperous and presumably satisfying urban centers such as “Shiraz with its paved streets and countless trees [which are different from the village whose streets are] still rocky, full of Satan Stones and wailing wind.” But again this seems to be a passing theme, one that you find here and there, but not everywhere.

On close inspection, however, it seems that Statan’s Stones as a literary work is best understood as an allegory for a struggle between two competing forms of power, two modes of framing and conceptualizing the world.  This is a struggle that takes place between the reality of the old and the dream of the new; between ingrained superstitions and sought knowledge; between the supernatural and the natural. It is a struggle within time between its different epochs and their significance and connotations.  Precisely, it is a struggle between antiquity, defined by continuity and armed with agency on one hand, and modernity defined by change and supported by common sense, on the other.  In terms of characterization this was a struggle between the nanny and Maryam. In the end, unfortunately, the former emerged triumphant. The latter was defeated.

The conflict between these two antagonists (there is no “protagonist,” Maryam could have been one, but she is too weak to fit) is projected and expressed throughout this short story in three different mediums; characterization through contrast, time as a host of culture, and virginity as a symbol of agency.

The story seems to eschew any detailed description of the physical traits of any of the characters except for a few cases when the nanny’s choice of dress color was highlighted; “she saw the kiln from a distance, and the nanny with her eternally black clothes…..she always wore black and she was always alone.”  Or later when the author shares a frightening look of the nanny’s “pursed lips and [her] look that pierced like a drill…her tattooed hairless eyebrow…her long thin her like red bloody snakes.”  Frightening as this depiction may seem, most of the insights into the characters

المزيد

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التصنيفات : غير مصنف |

أرسل الإدراج

دوّن الإدراج

History of Islam as a world History: Part II

By Ahmed Meiloud

One of the aspects that I have paid special attention to in the book is the author’s use of continuity. That is, how the author sees not only the relationship between the Islamic culture and its predecessors (in the civilizational sense), but also how he correlates its evolution with contemporaneous powers. It became evident as I read that Hodgson works on both levels. He provides a diachronic view; one that makes it possible to conclude that “certain evolutions in the pre-Islamic Roman and Sasanian empires…were decisive under Islam.”[1] He also provides a synchronic analysis were the developments within the realm of Islam are reflected upon in conjunction with contemporaneous developments elsewhere. The reference to the ‘commercial revolution’ and urban development in China when discussing what he termed ‘the High Caliphate Period,’ which witnessed a comparable boom in the Muslim controlled sphere as well, is a case in point. As matter of fact, Hodgson never fails to remind us that “the Chinese economic activity was directly reflected in the trade in the Southern Seas…where Chinese ports became an important terminus for Muslim vessels.”[2] Hodgson goes further to point out that this connection, which manifested primarily in trade, had far more important consequences:  “In arts and technology, new ideas came with more persistence from China than from any other one source and [as a consequence] the image of a well-governed Chinese empire became well-rooted abroad, at least in the Muslims literature.”[3] This fact allows Hodgson to stipulate that “the commercial life of the lands of Muslim rule was given a positive impetus by the great activity in China.”[4]

These connections between the Islamic culture and others, within and outside the boundaries of the Muslim society, are noted in several instances throughout this section of the book. Earlier in this section, Hodgson points to the heterogeneous and complex nature of the community that Muhammad had laid the foundation for. This is a community, according to Hodgson, where “both Muslims and non-Muslims [enjoyed] various degrees of membership.”[5] Even when he is not as generous in his assessment of the Muslim or, more precisely, of the Arabic culture Hodgson still looked at this culture from a comparative lens. Two instances [6] of this kind are particularly instructive. In the first instances, Hodgson asserts that the early and— in Hodgson’s judgment, rudimentary Islamic culture, which was predominantly Arabic, paled in comparison to the more advanced cultures of the period so much so that “neither Greek nor Aramaeans nor Persians of the time would have had reasons to be pay much attention.”

In the second instance, Hodgson puts further emphasis on the continuity between the Irano-Semetic traditions and the culture that flourished under Islam, even as he dismissively downplays the role of the Arabs: “From a broader historical viewpoint the Arabs were essentially foreigners being assimilated into an ongoing cultural pattern, which they helped modify, partly through some bits

المزيد

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التصنيفات : غير مصنف |

أرسل الإدراج

دوّن الإدراج

History of Islam as a world History: Part I

By Ahmed Meiloud

While the subject matter of Hodgson’s work is mainly the history of Islam, the reader can’t fail to notice that this is a work of a world historian, the work of a scholar who is preoccupied with parallels in human experience as reflected in the interplay of social, economic and political factors across spatial as well as temporal spheres.  The constant reference to other cultures and civilizations (adjacent to the birth place of Islam such Persians and the Byzantines or a far removed such as Europe, Africa and China, all of which had ultimately had contact with Islam as an immediate reality) is a clear evidence of this global perspective. More important however is Hodgson’s desire to highlight both continuities and discontinuities, i.e., the cultural aspects and civilizational elements which Islam inherited and continued to nourish and those which Islam as a cultural and civilizational force veiled and replaced. The assertion on one hand that Islam, unlike other major civilizations, failed to preserve or recognize the ‘lettered’ traditions of its region, and the contention at the same time that the Islamic civilization proceeded in a path trodden by its predecessors, inheriting “in large measure the problems, the opportunities, and the temptations of their ancestors in the region,” is particularly instructive (Hodgson, 103).

Because Hodgson was convinced of the accumulative, and one might add the linear, fashion in which the history of Islam, but also of the world, has progressed, he devoted a great amount of space and time to tracing the origins, the cultural developments that led to what he ter

المزيد

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التصنيفات : غير مصنف |

أرسل الإدراج

دوّن الإدراج

The following is a translation of an interview published on the website of Nouakchott info

http://www.ani.mr/?menuLink=37693cfc748049e45d87b8c7d8b9aacd&idInterview=97

Translator: Ahmed Meiloud

The Emir of “Al-Mulathamun Brigade”[A branch of Al-Qaeda in the Land of Islamic Maghreb] Khalid Abu al-‘Abbasin an interesting interview with “Akhbar Nouakchott

His real name is al-Mukhtar B. Muhammad Bil-Mukhtar. He is known among his comrades with his nom de guerre “Khalid Abu al-‘Abbas.” The Algerian press nicknamed him “the one-eyed,” a reference to his the eye he lost during the Afghani war against the Soviets at the beginning of the 1990s of the past century.

He was born in the city of Ghardaya in Algeria in 1972, and travelled to Afghanistan in early 1990s, when the Soviet army was on the verge of defeat. In Afghanistan, he received military training with scores of Algerians and other Arabs, the group that would later be known as the “Afghani Arabs.” Khalid Abu al-‘Abbas partook in some of the military operations before he returned to Algeria toward the end of 1992. Back in the country, he participated in what he called Jihad against the Algerian regime along with the fighters of the Armed Islamic Group.

Khalid Abu al-‘Abbas is widely recognized as the founder of the “Islamic Emirate of Sahara,” formerly known as the ninth region, in the classification of the GSPC. He was one of the early leaders in that group to discover the importance of the desert area between Mali and Niger, where he established his military camps. He also married a woman from the Touareg. He was for a period of time the emir of Sahara (up to 2007). Thereafter, he became the emir of the “al-Mulathamin Brigade” when Yahya Jwadi became the emir of the Sahara region. 

Despite the loss of this important position, Khalid Abu al-‘Abbas is still considered the desert’s most powerful and mysterious man. He enjoys a wide network of relations in the region.

 His name jumped to the front in Mauritania in 2005, when he led in July an attack on the military post at Limgheiti in the north. The operation left 17 Mauritanian soldiers dead. He also participated in several operations on the Mauritanian soil.

“Akhbar Nouakchott” interviewed Khalid Abu al-‘Abbas about many topics related to Libya and arm smuggling, Al-Qaeda operations in Mauritania, possibility of ceasing military operation in Mauritania, in addition to the rumors about his surrender negotiation with the Algerian authority a few years ago. The interview also covered the relationship between his organization and Al-Qaeda (mother organization) in Afghanistan. 

Akhbar Nouakchott: It is widely speculated that the Emirate of the Sahara [a branch of al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb] was the biggest winner from the Libyan Crisis through procurement of arms and also by consolidating its presence in the region. It’s been said that its members fought alongside the Libyan rebels. Is it true that you were partners in the fight against al-Qadhafi (on the side of the rebels)?

Khalid Abu al-‘Abbas:Thanks to Allah the Lord of the World. Indeed, the final victory will be granted to the pious ones. There is no aggression except against those who commit injustice.  Peace and prayers be upon our prophet, who was sent as a mercy to humanity—and may God’s peace and prayers be upon his family, his companions, and those who follow them until the Day of Judgment. This is a testimony of truth with which we seek Allah’s reward on the day in which we will meet Him, when no wealth or progeny will avail anyone, except those who come to Allah with sound/pure hearts.

Yes, the Mujahidin in Al-Qaeda were in general the party that reaped most benefit from Arab revolutions because these revolutions broke the chains of fear and the tore down the barrier of terror that their regimes (Western puppets) have imposed on [built around] them.

However, we think that these revolutions—including the Libyan revolution, did not bring the outcome that we hoped for (which is the establishment of a comprehensive rashidi Islamic way of life that touches all aspects of life). Yet, these are historic uprisings with enormous sacrifices on the part of the Umma, especially on the part of its youth.

In our view, the same intellectual and political secular establishment is still the dominant player. But the good thing is that the people of the region succeeded in regaining self-confidence and acquiring the ability to change and take the initiative.

Regarding our gains in terms of arms, this is a natural process in these kinds of conditions. But the most important thing for us is that the Libyan people—especially the youth of the Islamic Movement –put their hands on these arms, which had hitherto been in the hands of this regime, which it used against the people.

I shall take this opportunity to warn my brothers in Libya from falling to the trap of disarmament schemes. These weapons are the source of their respect and the sole guarantor of their security, God willing.

In regard to actual fighting against Gadhafi, we did not participate.

Akhbar Nouakchott: Some of the Libyan rebels face accusations that they have intellectual or organizational ties with you. Is it true that some of your comrades (brothers in arms or ideological convictions) are among the Libyan rebels?

Khalid Abu al-‘Abbas: It is obvious to anyone with eyes that the events in Libya show that the youth of the Islamic Awakening and especially the Jihadist segment were the first to face Al-Qadhafi Brigades, with their bare chests. They were the first spark that set off the Libyan massive revolution.
As to their intellectual or organizational ties with us, let me say that it is not a source of shame for a Muslim to be accused of having ties with other Muslims. To the contrary, it is an honor for us and for them. The stains of Western occupation of our lands—as manifested in artificial borders and senseless national considerations, did not impact our ways of life and faith, which dictate that a Muslim should come to the aid of his Muslim brother wherever s/he maybe: The prophet said “Help your brother to be victorious regardless of whether he is an oppressor or oppressed [in the first case you should advice him to stop and stand in his face; in the second case you should fight on his side]”. Muslims’ strength lies in their unity—something the disbelieving West has fought and continue to do so.

Akhbar Noukachott: You have been waging a war on Mauritania—a war which you started with your attack on Limgheiti in 2005 and [other] subsequent attacks such as al-Ghalawiya and Turin. Why did you decide to take the war to Mauritania and face its army with no justification?

Khalid Abu al-‘Abbas: About entering into war with the Mauritania army, [it should be noted] that we did not get directly involved in a war with the Mauritanian army in the traditional sense of war. Our operations against the Mauritanian army were somewhat limited. Attacking these armies is not part of our policies, nor is it a priority for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda declared strategy is attacking the Zionist and Crusader West, since it is the true governor of the Muslim lands.

This policy is crystal clear in all of Bin Laden’s pronouncements and in his interviews, may Allah bless his soul, and in those of Ayaman al-Zawahiri, may Allah protect him. It is also evident in all the literature of the movement—in its publications and so on.

Regarding Limgheiti, I think it is important that we speak about it in some details, since we have realized that the Mauritanian people did not understand our motives at the time, not to mention the misleading information and lies that were disseminated by  the regime of Wuld al-Tayi‘ through his press and media. The most blatant aspect of this misinformation was the press release distributed after the event by the Mauritanian Ministry of Defense in which it claimed that we slaughtered the captives. We should point out here that we did not slaughter any soldier and we challenge the Ministry of Defense to prove that we have done so to any of its soldiers at the post.

Limgheiti was not a declaration of war on Mauritania. It was a very limited operation, which we carried out for some reasons, which include among other things:

1-The participation of the Mauritanian army in an operational sense in the war on the Mujahidin. Limgheiti’s military camp was a base for joint war games between the Americans and Mauritanians. Some of the 35 soldiers that we captured admitted that American soldiers frequented the base and they gave us information about some of their facilities in the premises.  
You will find testimony of this in our release of the 35 soldiers after we gathered them and called them to [Islam/Jihad] and handed them some messages to pass to the Mauritanian regime. We studied the matter well before the operation. We gave orders not to shoot anyone who abandons his weapons, and we shouted such orders during the operation as well.

2-The Mauritanian regime had allowed the Israelis to have an embassy in the heart of Nouakchott—which represented a clear disregard to the feelings and dignity of the Mauritanian people and all Muslims, since Mauritania was at the time the only country outside the countries [encircling/ adjacent to Israel] that had public relationship with Israel. That period witnessed an unusual spike in the activities of the Mosad in Mauritania. This included the visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Silvan Shalom, which enraged all Mauritanians, a rage that was expressed in demonstrations in high schools and at the University.

It is no secret now to tell you that we set a trap for the Israeli ambassador in Mauritania a few minutes before our attack on the complex that housed the embassy and its night club at the time.

3- [The third reason is the] increase of oppression and persecution of the men of da‘wa  (those who call people to Islam). This manifested in the imprisonment, harassment, and torture of many scholars [‘ulama] and preachers. The matters was so bad that mosques were surrounded and fired at—as was the case in the mosqu

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The complete story of “Abu Yunus al-Muritani, the Al-Qaeda man who planned bombings in Europe

By: Al-Rabi‘ Wuld Idumu

Translator: Ahmed Meiloud

When Pakistani intelligence services announced the capture of the al-Qaeda leading figure in Afghanistan “Abu Yunus al-Muritani”, they were putting an end to a complex life-story of a Mauritanian young man who planned attacks on Europe by direct command from Bin Laden. This story shows how a slender Mauritanian gentleman was able to join the ranks of the leadership in the one of the most dangerous organization in the world.  This fighter was for long unknown to the public—he was however  the main pillar behind the merger between al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb and the [mother] organization in Afghanistan—which created a great deal of concern among international intelligence agencies.

In his house in a poor neighborhood in Nouakchott [capital of Mauritania], his mother, Amina mint Muhammad Ahmad, was not at first able to identify him as he was shown with raised eyebrows and a darker skin. However, after she was able to authenticate his identity and overcome the state of shock and silence [to which she had relapsed], she felt some relief for he is still at least alive. She told Saharamedias in a special interview:

“I had no hope of ever seeing him. Today, I have hope that he may be transferred to prison in Mauritania, at least…indeed I am a traumatized mother.” His younger brother, Muhammad Wuld Muhammad al-Husayn, was not at all surprised. He knew that “he was either dead or will soon be apprehended,” for the last time he had contact with the family was in 2007, when he left their house [in haste] just moments before a special anti-terrorism unit raided the house to find [a cold trail] and a passport, which his father handed over to them as the last item that Abu Yunus left in the house. This was the first time the Mauritanian security apparatus found a thread that linked him to another person of interest.  Subsequently, his picture was circulated to the public in April of 2008. At the time, the Mauritanian security apparatus believed he took part in the bloody clashes at “Centre Amateur” in the capital Nouakchott, in which two Mauritanian policemen and two al-Qaeda operatives were killed.

In the large house in which Abu Yunus was raised, his six sisters, five brothers and mother lived a state of shock when his central role in this dangerous global organization was revealed. His father also grappled with the news, which fell on him like a lightning strike while in Saudi Arabia, where he spends most of his time and where he works as an imam of a mosque and a visiting scholar. The news was difficult for the family but it also brought some hope (sham‘at amal jadida—a new candle of hope) since he is still alive and might one day come back home—as his pregnant sister, ‘Aysha says (she is a pregnant with a boy that Abu Yunus has no clue that is coming to life in a few months).

Abu Yunus al-Muritani was born in 1981. His birth was, for his mother, a dream came true as she had hoped he will be born while she was performing Hajj. She saw his birth in the sacred lands as a sign of good omen. His large family—a group of nomadic herders in the outskirts of Boutilimit were happy as well, and the boy became an exemplar of piety and true guidance in the common understanding of these terms by the simple Mauritanians.

This “guidied boy” would have lived in the remote village of Hasi al-mar‘a, which is located 100 Km [from the Capital] in the midst of Trarza’s sand dunes. However, his father who loved his children wanted his sons to live close to the paved road [to be connected to urban life] so that he can contact them from time to time. When the nomadic group, with which his family lived, moved to create the village of Bir al-Rahma (the well of mercy) the boy was among the 2000 [number seems wrong. It is very likely 200] individuals of his clan who settled in. Therein he studied Quran. ‘Abdallahi Wuld Al-Dawla, a Sufi youth and the current head of the local Mahdhara (Mauritanian traditional school) remembers very little from that period. He however recalls that he [Abu Yunus] completed his Ijaza [Quranic certificate] in Saudi Arabia and continued his education in the Institute of al-Araqam b. Abi al-Arqam for Religious Sciences, and in the Institute of the Mecca’s Holy Site.

Zakariya Wuld Ibuh, a retired Gendarmerie officer, was present at the time the establishment of the village in 1987 and remembers Abu Yunus al-Muritani, whose real name is “’Abd al-Rahman Wuld Muhammad al-Husayn wuld Muhammad Salim Wuld ‘Abd al-Jalil”. He remained in the village for three years and was widely known as al-Haj—as he was born when his mother was performing Hajj. His father was a religious man and became

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Ahmed Meiloud 

The book: The History of al-Tabari

Nature of the book: a multi-volumes work translated from Arabic to English

Original name of the work: Tarikh al-rusul wa al-muluk [The history of the prophets and kings]

This book is written by the medieval Muslim historian, Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari (833-923).

Publisher & year of Publication: State University Press of New York, 1987. 

This voluminous work comes in annotated translation in which many scholars contributed as translators or editors. Most of the translators are university professors from UK and U.S:  there are contributors from other countries as well.  For examples, the translator of vol. 34 is Joel L. Kraemer from Tel Aviv University.  The contributing translators include such renowned names in Oriental and Islamic studies as the late W. Montgomery Watt and Clifford Edmund Bosworth.  The project also drew in famous editors in the world of classical Islamic and Arabic literature such as Ihsan Abbas from the University of Jordan and Ehsan Yar-Shater from Columbia University.

Most of the volumes of this work are heavily footnoted, sometimes with footnotes taking most of the space on any given page.  Each volume includes a list of cited works, which can run for as long as several pages or as short as one. The list of cited works is often followed by a list of indices.  In most cases indices include alphabetized list of people names, place, and sometime separate indices for Qura’nic verses. In some volumes these indices are preceded by a list of abbreviations.

The original work by al-Tabari is an attempt to write a world history from the beginning of creation to his time. The book relies heavily in its treatment of early periods—that is, the history before t

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A personal account by the Mauritanian Engineer

Muhammad Abbat al-Chaykh

(parts 1 and 2) We will publish a translation of part 3 later (God willing)

Translator: Ahmed Meiloud

The original Arabic corresponding texts could be found at these links:

http://www.souhoufi.com/article4522.html?lang=ar

http://www.souhoufi.com/article4519.html?lang=ar

In that early morning on the East Coast of United States, I woke up in a room at the University of Dayton’s Hospital in Ohio. I had arrived the previous night after my boss (Mr. Abu Zakariya) had had a horrible accident on the highway between Cincinnati, Ohio and Detroit, Mechigan. Abu Zakariya, is a wealthy man from a Palestinian origin, tall and strong. He has a very thick beard. He was known to all mosques in the East Coast of U.S. His family, which consisted at the time of a wife and eight children, lived in the Arabic neighborhood in Chicago-Illinois.

His wife had asked me to take care of him until she could come, after making the necessary arrangements for a daycare for the little ones.  

I was on my way to a restaurant for a late breakfast after a sleepless and draining night of travel. I was stopped by the crowd watching big screens in the lobby. There was a dreadful silence—it was as if they had birds on their heads {Arabic proverbs, which signifies a complete sense of silence and stillness}. I will never forget the image of shock that appeared on everyone’s face—as they closed their mouths with their hands. Getting closer to the TV screen, I was able to read two lines:

The first line read: Breaking News. The second line read: America [is] Under Attack. I moved closer and the first thing I heard was that President Bush was leaving Florida to an undisclosed “safe” location and that his vice-president, Dick Cheney, had also moved to a safe and undisclosed place. Similarly, the Whitehouse spokesperson had also been moved to a safe location.

I was shocked for a second, but the news kept pouring in. The US airspace was closed to civilian flights, which meant the forced landing of around 600 flights that was at the moment in the air. Shorty thereafter came the news of the downing of the fourth plane in the outskirts of Pennsylvania and the collapse of the twin towers. In addition of course to constant updates about emergency, without any mention of precautions or a hint about the source of the attack. 

I returned back to the man who was sleeping between life and death. I sat next to him and told him of everything, speaking in an eloquent Arabic tongue (bi lisanin ‘arabiyyin mubin). He did not hear me. Some of the visitors coming from the mosque to check on him said they heard that al-Qaeda was responsible for the act. I will never forget the feeling of sadness that overcame me for the death of innocent people, especially those which I watched as they jumped from the high floors of the twin towers to a certain death. I also felt some deep feelings of satisfaction for the injury of the pride of those who had now been moved to “safe locations,” regardless of who was responsible. These feelings were also mixed with a great deal of uncertainty and fear.

I learned that morning that the means of strength are always weaker than the power of fear and that security (and all its synonyms are) the most important words in the dictionary of life.

Abu Zakariya regained his consciousness two days later and was in a condition which allowed him to transfer to a hospital in Chicago, Illinois, where his family lived.

I was alone on the road, clear-headed, traveling to Louisville, Kentucky, where our business is located. There I was to ensure that Abu Zakariya’s order of stopping business temporary was implemented until he recovers. And this was indeed what we did after consultation with Mrs. Diana, the director, and the lawyer. The situation was unstable and we were subject to several investigations from the FBI for reasonable doubts about the nature of our commercial activities, doubts that were fed, in part, by tense competition with other businesses.

During the first four days after the events, I was in complete isolation from all Mauritanians—although I heard that a wave of arrests targeting Arabs, especially, and Muslims in general was underway in all parts of the US. This campaign was spearheaded by the FBI, supported by the Immigration and Citizen Administration, drug, tobaco and alcohol enforcement agency—in addition, of course, to many security agencies with varied names and specializations.

We closed the “Alfa Trading” for the first time willingly. This marked a beginning of a terrible period of fear and uncertainty. I received many calls from my American friends. These calls focused on two issues: 1) Muhammad, are you Ok? We are worried about you!; 2) Muhammad you are not a terrorist, are you? Please be careful!

Once my dear friends prepared me psychologically to all probabilities, I started to think critically about the weakest and strongest points in my contingency plan; started to think of the best way to survive. My fears were exacerbated by the ferociousness of the media campaign and street ads about the need to report anything suspicious or anyone that constitutes a threat “in your opinion.” The atmosphere was so tense that I started to feel suspicious looks wherever I ago. My fears kept soaring as I saw the buses of t

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The following is a translation of an article by

Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Shinqitti

*

Published on the following link

http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/EXERES/0750ED68-5601-4731-B00A-0B8FC6642C2E.htm

Translator: Ahmed Meiloud

A Noble Prize with a scarf

The Arab Spring opened for the Arabs a window to change their negative image in the Western mind and international media. It was incontrovertible evidence that those who respect themselves force others to respect them. The granting of the Nobel Prize this year to the Yemeni politician and revolutionary, Tawakul Kurman, is another evidence of the precious fruit of these Arab revolutions.

Arabs and Muslims have in the past few decades paid close attention to their tainted image in the international media.

Many Arab academics and media professionals wrote to shatter this image. The late Palestinian thinker Edward Said led this effort on the stereotypical and inhumane image of Arabs and Muslims with his book Orientalism, which opened a window to “the East” in Western Culture. 

Said has influenced many thinkers in the East as well as in the West. His book has a lasting impact on American academia.

Many Arab academics followed the footsteps of Said. Among these are: Yusuf Yusuf, with his study on the image of Arabs in Jewish Literature, Samy Muslim with his study of Arabs’ image in German press, and Khudry Sari for his study on the depiction of Arabs in English press.

Some wealthy Arab governments also made some efforts to change their negative image in American press. However, some of these attempts were very injudicious. They included running blatant (bereft of imagination and subtleties) advertisements in popular American newspapers at an exorbitant cost, a gesture that showed lack of competency on the part of these regimes even as they often possessed good intentions.

But the problem with these kinds of efforts (both academic and propagandistic) is that they implicitly carry self-exoneration.  It blames everything on others as if convincing the Americans and Europeans that we are humans would suffice to solve our chronic social and political problems. It is as if changing our image (in their eyes) will change our reality. The opposite is true: nations change their images in others’ minds by changing their own reality.

I am not belittling here the significance of the studies on stereotypical images or the value of the efforts made to change them. I am not also downplaying the danger of ignoring the coordinated academic and media efforts taken by some political and religious organizations with Zionist inclinations in the US and Europe.

I believe, however, that the biggest effort should be dedicated to changing the reality, not the stereotypes. And this is what the revolting Arab youths seem to have understood better than the academics.

The revolting Arab youth today are distinguished by their idealism, courage and their clean hands. These important moral values made all humanity bow down out of respect to these youths.  These youths have lifted our nation from the abyss and made us an example for others to emulate.

The impact of this is clear even in the dark corners of the world, corners that were far too distant for Arabs or Arabic culture to impact. The “occupy Wall Street” movement proudly announced a few days ago on its webpage that “we use the tactics of the Arab Spring to further our goals and to encourage peaceful activism to ensure the safety of participants in the demonstrations.”

Moreover, some members of this movement wore t-shirts with Arabic signs that read “we will not keep silent,” the Arab word “irhal” (leave) was used as well during the demonstration week in Israel.

I notice during the tense days of the Egyptian revolution the presence of three commentators (pundits) from the New York Times in the Liberation Square in Cairo. These were Thomas Friedman, Roger Cohen and Nicolay Christophe.

These three are Jewish and are known for their love to Israel and its policies, and for harboring differing levels of animosity toward Arabs. Thomas Friedman is the worst in this regard (yet the dearest to some Arab leaders!). The two others have a humanistic tendency which at times attenuates their bias. 

I noticed that the three of them suddenly changed from attacking Arabs to praising the “humanistic spirit” (this phrase was coined by Friedman himself) shown by the Egyptians during their revolution.

Anyone who has closely followed their writings during the past decade in this newspaper—as I have—would have known how indebted we are to the Arab youths for restoring our honor and correcting our tainted image.

The fact that an Arab women, known for her Islamist political orientation (she is a member of the Shura Council of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform), received Noble Prize for peace marks a significant

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